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A commemoration is an invitation to go beyond the thing being commemorated. Such an 
invitation to surpass becomes more compelling when the thing commemorated is summarized and 
updated and the surpassing more vividly illustrated. This essay does the former by means of 
selective references to both editions of the “Social Psychology of Organizing” (1969, 1979). The 
essay describes an evolving vocabulary intended to focus on meaning and collective action. The 
three associated studies in this special section extend that vocabulary.
At the outset I want to be clear that my work is that of a generalist. This is apparent if 
you simply scan the bibliography in the 1969 book, where Allport (both Floyd and Gordon), 
Blau, Garfinkel, Mead (both George Herbert and Margaret), Perrow, Simmel, and Skinner join 
one another. There is the suggestion of an author building a collage in the hope that someday it 
will evolve into a mosaic where the parts form a more coherent image. That hope persists. But 
that is not to dismiss a collage. ‘Collage, the art of reassembling fragments of preexisting 
images in such a way as to form a new image, was the most important innovation in the 
twentieth century because it’s all been said before” (Shields, 2011, item 44). A generalist works 
at the intersection of vocabularies, which means he or she is known as much by their inputs as 
by their outputs. 
The evolving vocabulary of organized sensemaking is primed by a provocative moment 
captured in William Shakespeare’s “A midsummer Night’s Dream” (1922). In Act V, Scene I. 
Theseus says, 
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Doth glance from heaven to earth, from earth to heaven;
And as imagination bodies forth
The forms of the things unknown, the poet’s pen
Turns them to shapes and gives to airy nothing
A local habitation and a name.”
The poet’s eye reenacts sensemaking. Flux in the form of ‘airy nothing’ begins to 
materialize when it is imagined into hunches about forms and shapes which are then given a 
name and pinned down to a “local habitation” that can be shared.
Shakespeare’s basics are also fleshed out in William James’s description of a similar 
progression. The flux of pure experience “no sooner comes than it tends to fill itself with 
emphases, and these salient parts become identified and fixed and abstracted; so that experience 
now flows as if shot through with adjectives and nouns and prepositions and conjunctions. Its 
purity is only a relative term, meaning the proportional amount of unverbalized sensation which 
it still embodies.” (James, 1987, p.783).  
The vocabularies of sensemaking and organizing were pinned down in a more mundane 
manner by two early definitions. In 1969, organizing was defined as “the resolving of 
equivocality in an enacted environment by means of interlocked behaviors embedded in 
conditionally related processes” (1969, p. 91). Ten years later organizing was now defined as 
“a consensually validated grammar for reducing equivocality by means of sensible interlocked 
behaviors (1979, p. 3). These days sensemaking tends to be referred to as “the ongoing 
retrospective development of plausible images that rationalize what people are doing.” (Weick, 
Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005, p. 409). 
Common across these various descriptions are references to retrospect, plausibility, 
images, reasons, intersubjective action, and constructing. The unifying mechanism is one in 
which micro level activities enact order which is then read off retrospectively as justification. 
“Past deeds are made to appear sensible to the actor himself and to those other persons to whom 
he feels accountable” (1969, p. 38). Organizing, thus becomes an interpersonal process that 
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suggest one such sequence when people turn “circumstances into a situation that is 
comprehended explicitly in words and that serves as a springboard for action.” 
The preceding components can be converted into a workable sequence built around 
sensemaking if we focus on  movement from flux-> hunches->words-> actions-> back to flux. 
In 1969, an equivalent progression was movement from enactment to selection to retention back 
to enactment and selection (p.87). 
The movement from flux to hunches is a pragmatic simplification that creates a 
workable level of certainty (1979, p. 6). The movement from hunches into words is crucial since 
“there is no such thing as non-discursive access to truth” (Rorty, 2016, pp. 52-53). 
The movement from words into actions produces meanings of varying depth. This 
variation is implicit in John Dewey’s categorical imperative: ‘So act as to increase the meaning 
of present experience…. (S)tudy the needs and alternative possibilities lying within a unique 
and localized situation” (Dewey, 2002, p. 283). He urges that we do this repeatedly so that it 
becomes a habit and the way in which we approach every situation. Whether meanings are 
increased or not, the actions associated with them alter the flux and in doing so, reconstitute the 
enactor.
Having suggested a scaffolding for sensemaking and organizing built from the materials 
of 1969, I want to say more about what is behind and between those four connected elements 
of flux, hunches, words, and actions. After I sample four of those nuances, I comment on the 
three studies that make up this section. And finally, I conclude with a handoff composed of a 
dream about magic and a conceptual postcard. 
   Nuances that underlie sensemaking and organizing
To introduce additional nuance, I add Soren Kierkegaard to the duo of William 
Shakespeare and William James. All three of these thinkers make an effort to address the 
disjunction between experience and understanding. That disjunction is especially clear in 
Kierkegaard’s (1843, p. 306) discussion of his insight that life is lived forward but understood 
backward. "It is really true what philosophy tells us, that life must be understood backwards. 
But with this, one forgets the second proposition, that it must be lived forwards. A proposition 
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life at any given moment cannot really ever be fully understood; exactly because there is no 
single moment where time stops completely in order for me to take position [to go] backwards”. 
Kierkegaard’s pattern is consistent with an existential treatment in which forward 
existence precedes backward essence -, we can know what we’ve done only after we do it 
(Weick, 1969, p.64). “Pragmatism is a philosophy of finitude. We can’t know if we’re headed 
in the right direction….. ‘The only sure test of utility is unfortunately retrospective” (Rorty, 
2016, p. 56). " 
Organizational life lived forward and backward maps readily onto the distinction 
between an immanent practice lived forward and a deliberate practice lived backward 
(Sandberg and Tsoukas, 2020). Immanent sensemaking is characterized by the forward 
experience of absorbed coping. Deliberate sensemaking is more thematic and abstract and more 
suited to restoration or renewal. Sensemaking in a practice world is immanent, until there is an 
interruption in which case the sensemaking becomes involved-deliberate which might 
necessitate that it become detached-deliberate if resumption becomes problematic.
Since immanent forward experience is fleeting and less visible, it is tempting to 
emphasize activities of deliberate backward understanding as the primary site for sensemaking. 
To yield to such temptation is to neglect the interplay of experience and understanding. I want 
to illustrate that interplay by exploring four possible relationships between experience and 
understanding: self-validating prophecy, partiality toward similarity, ambivalence between 
belief and doubt, and understanding as ongoing accomplishment.
Self-validating prophecy.   The prototype for a close relationship between experience 
and understanding is the self-fulfilling prophecy (SFP). It serves as a prototype because it is a 
mechanism of self-validation. Gregory Bateson describes the mechanism as the partial 
production of epistemological and ontological premises that are self-validating. “Beliefs about 
what sort of world it is, will determine how he sees it and acts within it, and his ways of 
perceiving and acting will determine his beliefs about its nature” (1972, p. 314). William James 
(1984), similarly, argues that “The knower is an actor, and co-efficient of the truth on one side, 
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To be a coefficient of what you confront is to bring agency into sensemaking. Prophesies 
give form to experience. The resulting forms produce an enacted environment of ecological 
changes that are more likely to fulfill than subvert the beliefs that gave form to the enactment. 
A powerful example of the effect of an SFP is Wilkinson’s (2009) discussion of 
sensemaking and decision making in an intensive care unit where patients are predicted to have 
bad outcomes. The possibility of an SFP becomes salient when there are decisions about the 
withdrawal of life support on the basis of predicted high mortality (e.g. the prediction of high 
mortality for extremely premature infants at 22 or 23 weeks gestation). Predictions can affect 
the outcome, and, in the case of uncertainty, “the SFP is a necessary consequence of decision-
making” (p. 409). Wilkinson alters the phrase “self-fulfilling prophecy” and redescribes it as a 
“self-reinforcing prophecy.” He does this to distinguish the medical case from Robert Merton’s 
original example of a run on a bank triggered by a false initial rumor that the bank is failing. 
The ICU setting is one where a self-fulfilling prophecy is “a prediction (that a certain outcome 
is likely or inevitable) that independently increases the probability of the outcome actually 
occurring” (p. 403).
Wilkinson argues that it is imperative that doctors be honest with themselves, their 
patients, their families about uncertainty and the limits of knowledge. “In many cases it is 
simply not possible to know how likely it is that a patient would survive if all supportive 
treatments were provided. It might be difficult for families to accept, but it still might be the 
best course of action to withdraw treatment and allow that patient to die” (p. 409).
Partiality toward similarity    A different relationship between understanding and 
experience is one where understanding is biased toward an emphasis on similarity. This bias 
was implied in 1969. “An organization attempts to transform equivocal information into a 
degree of unequivocality with which it can work and to which it is accustomed” (1969, p. 40). 
That word “accustomed” means that “People strive for a minimum of jolt, a maximum of 
continuity. We hold a theory true just in proportion to its success in solving this ‘problem of 
maxima and minima.” (James, 1987, p. 513). 
Minimizing jolts is evident in the much discussed sensemaking practice of 
“normalization”. Diane Vaughan (2005) described the practice in the context of the Challenger 
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taken-for-granted aspects of shuttle performance” (p. 34). This is why some organizations, such 
as High Reliability Organizations (e.g. Ramanujam & Roberts, 2018, Weick & Sutcliffe, 2015) 
are designed to help avoid traps such as this. Their attention is more focused on failure, 
unwarranted simplification, present operations, resilience, and distributed expertise. These 
tendencies are sensitive to the fact that same and different are mixed, they do not give off clear 
signals. This means that analysts have to construct these differences through a process of  
sensemaking that involves “interrelating current events, prior knowledge, and future 
expectations” (Macrae, 2014, p. 204).
A bias toward similarity creates two additional vulnerabilities. First, identification of 
similar origins is flawed because the observer keeps changing.   “(E)very experience enacted 
and undergone modifies the one who acts and undergoes, while this modification affects, 
whether we wish it or not, the quality of subsequent experience. For it is a somewhat different 
person who enters into them” (Dewey, 1997, p. 35). Second, origins themselves are elusive. 
“The activity of the individual is only in a certain sense caused by the stimulus of the situation 
because that activity is itself helping to produce the situation which causes the activity of the 
individual….We shall  never catch the stimulus stimulating or the response responding” 
(Follett, 1924, p. 60).
Ambivalence between belief and doubt    Efforts to treat experiences as similar often 
are accompanied by quiet doubts of whether those judgments overlook crucial differences. 
The duality between belief and doubt has remained prominent since 1969 (pp. 88-89) 
when it was portrayed as a means to preserve adaptability. A decision to doubt and believe past 
experience simultaneously was accomplished by linking each with a different process. For 
example, past experience could be treated as a reliable guide in the process of enactment, but 
questioned in the selection process when the “familiar” enactment is interpreted. This duality 
of belief and doubt is preserved by Milosevic, Bass, and Combs (2018) in their study of a 
multisystem hydroelectric power producer. They discuss a recurring pattern where individuals 
face unexpected events that require timely action but where the wrong response may have grave 
consequences. “As such, individuals must simultaneously utilize and question their current 
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In previous discussions of sensemaking and organizing, the co-presence of dualities, 
especially that of belief and doubt, has been preserved in Donald Campbell’s (1965) important 
insight that “in multiple-contingency environments, the joint presence of opposing tendencies 
has a functional survival value.  Where each of two opposing tendencies has survival relevance, 
the biological solution seems to be an ambivalent alternation of expressions of each rather than 
the consistent expression of an intermediate motivational state.  Ambivalence, rather than 
averaging, seems the optimal compromise" (p. 305).
This optimal compromise is apparent in wildland firefighting. When firefighters engage 
a fire burning in different kinds of foliage that could be fanned by shifting winds, they manage 
that knowledge with a protocol built around ambivalence. The protocol calls for them to deploy 
Lookouts, Communication, Escape routes (at least two), and Safety zones (LCES: Gleason, 
1991).  Belief in what they know is enacted in the form of Lookouts and Communication for a 
“known” fire. And doubt about what they know is enacted by Escape routes, and Safety zones 
if they need to retreat from a potentially “unknown” fire. All of this can be rendered 
pragmatically as “ambivalence creates resilience” (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001, p. 167).
Belief and doubt have adaptive potential, but considerably more so when they are 
embedded in wisdom. Meacham’s (1990, pp. 187, 210) detailed analysis of wisdom illustrates 
the parallels. “To be wise is … to both accumulate knowledge while remaining suspicious of 
it, and recognizing that much remains unknown….The essence of wisdom is in knowing that 
one does not know, in the appreciation that knowledge is fallible, in the balance between 
knowing and doubting.” Birren and Fisher (1990, p.326) make a similar connection.. “Wisdom 
is a balance between opposing valences of intense emotion and detachment, action and inaction, 
and knowledge and doubts”. 
Wise ambivalence may sound like an oxymoron, but in multiple-contingency 
environments where the contingencies are both novel and familiar, wisdom does not mean the 
inadequate balance of averaging but the enlarged balance of meaningful oppositions.  
Understanding as ongoing accomplishment.   The relationships between experience 
and understanding can be tightened and treated as an ongoing accomplishment. This changes 
the disjunction of a duality into the conjunction of a dualism (Farjoun, 2010). An exemplary 
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& Dandridge (1983, p. 24). “The concept of sensemaking focuses attention upon the idea that 
reality of everyday life must be seen as an ongoing ‘accomplishment’ which takes particular 
shape and form as individuals attempt to create order and make retrospective sense of the 
situations in which they find themselves….The sensemaking metaphor encourages an analytical 
focus upon the processes through which individuals create and use symbols; it focuses attention 
upon the study of symbolic processes through which reality is created and sustained. Individuals 
are not seen as living in, and acting out their lives in relation to, a wider reality, so much as 
creating and sustaining images of a wider reality, in part to rationalize what they are doing. 
They realize their reality, by ‘reading into’ their situation patterns of significant meaning.” 
These tightened interdependencies between experience and understanding, are vividly 
illustrated in Scott Snook’s (2001) marvelous analysis of a friendly fire incident over Iraq in 
April 1994. Two F-15 pilots shot down two friendly helicopters, killing 26 people. As Snook 
says, “this is not an incident where F-15 pilots ‘decided’ to pull the trigger….Framing the 
individual-level puzzle as a question of meaning rather than deciding shifts the emphasis away 
from individual decision makers toward a point somewhere ‘out there’ where context and 
individual action overlap. …Such a reframing—from decision making to sensemaking—
opened my eyes to the possibility that, given the circumstances, even I could have made the 
same ‘dumb mistake.’ This disturbing revelation, one that I was in no way looking for, 
underscores the importance of initially framing such senseless tragedies as ‘good people 
struggling to make sense,’ rather than as ‘bad ones making poor decisions.’” (pp. 206-207).
Shifting the locus for meaning and action from an individual head to “out there” 
suggests that human decisions are “not so much deliberate choices as they are arbitrary 
ontological ‘incisions’ made….into the flux of reality to temporarily stabilize an ever fluxing 
and changing world in order to render it more predictable and hence more liveable.” (Chia, 
2014, p.20). The enactment is “ontological” because it reifies a subject-object split. And the 
enactment is an “incision” because it carves brackets around some portion of the flux.
    Extensions: Organizing, defending, intuiting
Given the preceding ideas, I want to comment briefly on the three studies that 
accompany this essay. Their intent, form, and substance provide models for going beyond.  
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Glynn and Watkiss (2020) have written a historical review of ideas that invites 
elaboration. The authors change the connection between sensemaking and organization from 
sensemaking IN organization to sensemaking AS organization. They underline this shift when 
they use the word “fuse” to describe sensemaking as the vehicle for how organizing is 
accomplished. This fusion makes organizing a stance rather than a place. The stance is one in 
which members move sequentially from shared cause maps to sensemaking to interpretation to 
coordinated action and then cycle back to reflect on the adequacy of the map and the presumed 
sharing.
Cause maps themselves are reinstated (Bougon, Weick, Binkhorst, 1977) as noticing 
repertoires that attach ‘labels to the discrete events parsed out during enactment and that were 
causally connected to one another.” Those labels stand for shared equivalent experiences, which 
means they are connotations of overlap. The word “Equivalent” is noteworthy here because it 
means that the shared experience is “sufficient for coordinated action.” The word is also 
noteworthy because of a shared family resemblance to the word “equivocal.” Equivocal 
environments have multiple meanings and multiple overlapping equivalent interpretations of 
those multiples are sufficient to produce the stability of one among the many.
The importance of multiples is evident in the fact that when meaning is mentioned, those 
mentions are plural rather than singular. That was the original reason for using the awkward 
word, equivocality, when there were more familiar words such as ambiguity and uncertainty. 
To be equivocal is to be open to more than one meaning. That’s why sensemaking is about 
frames and not decisions. When I see what I say, it is seldom singular and the same holds true 
for the thoughts that derive from my interpretation.
Other details in this paper help connect its several themes. Ecological change is 
redescribed as changes involving experience rather than changes involving physical events. The 
purpose of organizing has been simplified to enabling ‘coordinated action in a world of multiple 
possibilities” (Weick, 1995, p. 75). Some of the details in this paper are organized into a 
contingency model where the cycle varies in the tightness with which the elements are coupled. 
In a loosely coupled system, maps can be separated from coordinated action more readily. As 
a result, improvisation, work arounds, and experiments are more common. In tightly coupled 
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among labels on the maps are treated as expectations, then the tighter the coupling, the higher 
the probability of surprise.
Given the authors’ attempt to cover at least 50 years devoted to updating a gerund 
(organizing), one can put a context around those years with the help of Will Schutz (1979). He 
argues that understanding moves from superficial simplicity, through confused complexity, and 
can result in profound simplicity. Glynn and Watkiss document movements from one confusion 
to another, but in doing so hint at a deeper simplicity. The experience of meaning “reconstitutes 
an evolving present.” (Langley and Tsoukas, 2010, p. 13). Those four words connote 
reaccomplishment, change, a fleeting present, construction, interruption, a blend of past and 
future, continuity, and activity.
 Mikkelsen, Gray, and Petersen (2020)
In this important paper, conscious, unconscious, cognitive, and emotional aspects of 
sensemaking are combined into a more holistic view. The paper is important because other 
investigators have “paid less attention to the contested nature of meaning.” That is certainly 
true in my Mann Gulch discussion (Weick, 1993). For example, when foreman Wagner Dodge 
yells at second-in- command Bill Hellman to move into the safer area being cleared by Dodge’s 
escape fire, Hellman yells back ‘to hell with that, I’m getting out of here,” surely a very brief 
moment of contested meaning. 
The larger sequence of defense is one in which threat leads to anxiety which leads to 
unconscious emotions and desires and to defenses against the threat and the emotions by means 
of rationalization, projective identification, and fantasy. This progression is profoundly 
emotional and largely unconscious. It affects both intergroup relationships and accomplishment 
of the primary task. The Mann Gulch firefighting crew splits up, runs past Dodge’s escape fire, 
and 12 of the 15 firefighters die as the fire they were assigned to put, out sweeps over them,
The authors argue that “strange associations and contradictions are clues to unconscious 
work”. Those clues can also foreshadow work that is more conscious such as the reduction of 
cognitive dissonance. Dissonance theory “is essentially a theory about sense making: how 
people try to make sense out of their environment and their behavior and, thus, to lead lives that 
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Ongoing relationships between Hospital and Community, in the context of revolving 
door readmissions, increasingly contain stereotypes of incompetence on the part of the other 
party. The tensions associated with these threats can be represented less consciously by 
psychodynamics or more consciously by cognitive dissonance (Beauvois & Joule, 1996). 
Dissonance can be visualized as a ratio of relevant cognitive elements that are consonant or 
dissonant with a generative cognition, such as “I am professionally competent” As the ratio of 
elements that are dissonant with the generative cognition increases relative to the total number 
of dissonant and consonant cognitions, sensemaking becomes dominated by thoughts, feelings 
and actions that operate in the service of dissonance reduction. Thus, we see conscious 
substitutes for rationalization, projections, and fantasies in the form of consonant 
interpretations, such as the relationship is required by the government rather than chosen, 
unimportant, proof of one’s own competence to manage their mistakes, temporarily unsettled, 
etc. Whether accomplished more or less consciously, social defense and dissonance reduction 
produce the appearance of calm and what looks like logical coordination.w But the assumptions 
that make this façade possible are misleading, detrimental to task performance, and unfavorable 
to relationships.
The work of these authors is a clear example of the complexity of going beyond. Using 
enactment, selection, and retention as a platform, they show how the products of these three 
generic processes are significantly influenced by the unconscious social defenses of 
rationalization (enactment), projective identification (selection), and fantasy (retention). 
However, each defense seemingly could be associated with any one of the three evolutionary 
processes. Fantasy limits the intensity of emotion and is primed by retained experiences, but 
the fantasy that Hospital could be in charge not only incorporates retained themes, it also selects 
consonant interpretations that explain enacted deference. The authors neatly handle these 
complexities when they introduce the contingency of the magnitude of anxiety. When anxiety 
is low, the defenses flow “alongside” the unfolding evolutionary process. When anxiety is high 
(“inordinate anxiety”), it’s as if the evolutionary processes now flow alongside and subordinate 
to the defenses. 
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The title for this article is perfect. The authors add specificity to the phrase “people act 
their way into sense” by focusing on the act of intuition. And they generalize that specificity by 
incorporating the typically missing role of the body and affect in those actions. Recall that 
sensemaking is often portrayed as an episodic deliberate activity that invokes a mind separated 
from a body. If one replaces the separations with relationships, then the treatment becomes 
more holistic and more aligned with experience.
This study describes a nexus rather than a disjunction. The disjunction between 
experience and understanding shrinks when the incipient understanding in an intuition provides 
a vague outline for an evolving experience. When intuition is described as a “non-sequential, 
and non-conscious information processing mode that comprises both cognitive and emotional 
elements”, this description suggests a parallel between intuition and the activity of 
improvisation. Improvisation also tends to be rapid, non-conscious, non-sequential (Miner, 
Bassof, & Moorman, 2001; Kamoche, Cunha, & Cunha, 2003).
When the authors mention bodily reactions (e.g. we examined “how they made their 
intuitions happen”), they refer to a “rich repertoire of bodily actions.” This adds intriguing 
complexity since response repertoires can control noticing (Weick, 1969, p. 26), As Ron 
Westrum puts it, “A system’s willingness to become aware of problems is associated with its 
ability to act on them” (1993, p. 340). What’s intriguing here is that abilities in the form of 
“hands-on” capability could, if present, affect the content of intuitions, feelings and assertive 
speech or could if absent reduce all three. The authors do mention that expertise strengthens 
intuition.  
The word “intuition”, like the word “organization”, lends itself to the image of a thing 
rather than a process. For example, the movie script is an object that is intuitable. That being 
the case, an actor may or may not have the abilities to convert the intuitable into sense by means 
of displaying, working, and expressing. Gerunds keep sensemaking moving. Intuiting, rather 
than intuitions, is what moves an initial tacit, intimate, and complex sense into a public, simpler, 
ordered sense.
The fact that filming involves a temporary organization, multiplies the contingencies 
that trigger intuition (e.g. the hairstyle of an anonymous extra). What is less clear is the effect 
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organizing: “Organizing implies generalizing; the subsumption of heterogeneous particulars 
under generic categories. In that sense, formal organization necessarily involves abstraction.” 
(Tsoukas 2005: 124).In settings that are less temporary, there may be fewer triggers, more 
reliance on generic categories, fewer expressed intuitions and less adaptation and adaptability.
This article made me even more conscious of the missing body in sensemaking. As I 
searched for explanations of why I missed that aspect, I remembered a remark made by the 
archivist at the University of Michigan who is working with my collected papers. She said 
“theorists tend to work in their own heads.” That remark hits home. It’s hard for me to get 
excited about the body’s role in sensemaking when I spend all day becoming enchanted while 
immobilized at a desk, vigorously raising and lowering my desk chair, leaning forward and 
backward, staring out the window at a real world, gripping and releasing a pen, and power-
lifting 3 x 5 cards. That’s not to disparage the desk work or the body, but only to contextualize 
them. There are other contexts in which to go beyond, like making a film.
Conclusion
To help put a frame around this essay, I want to recount a nighttime dream I had shortly 
after the Call for Papers for this section was announced. In the dream I’m on a stage in a large 
auditorium that is filled with people celebrating a birthday. I am standing behind a table that is 
full of magic tricks, some piled on top of others, most of them still in their cellophane wrappers 
and sealed boxes.  I have no idea what the tricks are or how they work. I begin my performance 
with the two magic tricks that I do know how to perform. They are small sized “linking” rings, 
and the disappearing ball-in-a-cup, the kind of beginner magic tricks you’d find in a cheap 
magic set. Once I’ve performed those two, I look down, see the mass of remaining tricks, pick 
up the whole table and dump all of the tricks into the audience. I do so not in anger but in the 
spirit of, you figure them out. I briskly walk offstage and out the door hoping to get away before 
the crowd catches up to me and asks, ‘what was that all about?” 
That five-word question, “what was that all about,” is a perfect example of sensemaking. 
Two of those 5 words, “that” and “what”, point respectively to flux and sense (James, 1987, p. 
782). The “that” of a dumped table of supposed magic tricks could become any one of a number 
of “whats” including a publicity stunt, an accident, an allegory, misguided sharing, a confession, 
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The present essay fits the same pattern. It now becomes a “that,” subject to interpretation 
into any one of a number of “whats.” To assist that interpreting, think of this essay as a 
conceptual postcard. That image derives from a tactic found in Ross Parmenter’s book, ‘The 
awakened eye” (1968). He suggests that when you visit an art museum to view a painting, you 
first stop at the gift shop and buy a postcard reproduction of that painting. When you then view 
the original painting, hold your postcard reproduction up next to it. What you will discover is 
that the postcard reproduction is imperfect. You may see that the original has highlights that 
are more vivid, textures that are more visible, there are more gradations of color, the shadows 
actually contain figures, etc. A similar act of comparison occurs when you hold up concepts 
next to everyday life and see what the concept fails to register. My job has been to hand you a 
postcard that is imperfect in ways you can now see more clearly.
Footnotes
1. Acknowledgement: I am deeply grateful for the help of Kathleen Sutcliffe, Hari 
Tsoukas, and Kyle Weick in the construction of this essay.
2. The following discussion includes several quotations. The intentions are to preserve 
the original context of the idea; to make it easier for readers to develop their own interpretations 
of the point being made; to document that my “evidence” lies in a lineage of ideas; to preserve 
abstractions that facilitate generalization; and to avoid the removal of subtleties by rough 
paraphrase. Walter Benjamin, an avid collector of quotations, put a more spirited spin on the 
practice when he said that the role of a quotation is not to illustrate but to arrest and disrupt 
complacent understanding. Quotations “are like wayside robbers who leap out and rob you of 
your convictions.” (Sniedziewski, 2017, p.138).
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